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I. INTRODUCTION
By the time this Article appears, nearly a decade will have
passed since the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines constitutionally dead, and in its next
breath resurrected them in advisory form.1 From the point of
view of the federal bench and bar, and of the academics who earn
their daily crust watching lawyers at play, the years since the
Booker decision have been a turbulent time. The Supreme Court
itself has issued more than twenty decisions construing,
clarifying, or applying one aspect or another of Booker doctrine. 2
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162-63 (2013) (holding that
because mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime, any fact that
increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury);
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081, 2088 (2013) (holding that the Ex Post Facto
Clause is violated when a defendant is sentenced under Federal Sentencing Guidelines
promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher
sentencing range than the version in place at time of offense); S. Union Co. v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2350, 2357 (2012) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490 (2000)) (holding that the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, which holds that facts
increasing the statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to the jury, applies to the
imposition of criminal fines); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (2012)
(holding that the Fair Sentencing Act's new, lower mandatory minimums apply to the
post-Act sentencing of pre-Act offenders); Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1249
(2011) (holding that when defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, district
court at resentencing may consider evidence of defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation
which may support a downward variance from the advisory guidelines range); Abbott v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 18, 25, 29 (2010) (holding that a defendant is subject to the
highest mandatory minimum sentence specified for his conduct under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), unless another provision of law directed to such conduct imposes
a greater mandatory minimum); Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907-09, 2925,
2927, 2931-32 (2010) (holding that former corporate executive failed to establish that
pretrial publicity prevented him from obtaining a fair trial on federal fraud-related
charges, and that the "honest services" fraud proscription in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is limited to
bribery and kickbacks); United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224-26, 235 (2010)
(holding that the fact that a firearm was a machinegun is an element to be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, not a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge at sentencing); Dillon
v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821, 824, 828-30 (2010) (holding that Booker does not
apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) proceedings and therefore does not require treating U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BL.10 as advisory); Spears v. United States, 555
U.S. 261, 262, 265-66 (2009) (holding that federal district courts are entitled, in criminal
sentencing, to reject and vary categorically from the ratio between quantities of powder
cocaine and crack cocaine on the basis of a policy disagreement with the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009) (holding that in light of
historical practice and States' authority over administration of their criminal justice
systems, the Sixth Amendment does not inhibit States from assigning to judges the
finding of facts necessary to the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses);
Moore v. United States, 555 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2008) (holding that the resentencing of an
accused by a federal district court was warranted as the court did not think it had
discretion to reject the crack/powder disparity in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
concerning cocaine possession); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)
(holding that absent a federal government appeal or cross-appeal, a federal court of
appeals cannot, on its own initiative, order an increase in a defendant's sentence); Irizarry
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Federal appellate courts have cited Booker more than 10,000
times and federal district courts have published more than 8,000
opinions mentioning Booker.3 Academics have written over 2,200
journal articles citing Booker and more than 220 with Booker in
the title. 4 From a lawyer's perspective, it is hardly surprising
that Booker should have generated so much high-voltage
controversy. To undertake a conversation about Booker is to
plunge into an intellectual bouillabaisse in which constitutional
theory, criminal sentencing theory, inter-branch rivalries
between the executive, judicial, and legislative arms of the
federal government, tricky points of statutory interpretation, and
pragmatic considerations of crime control, criminal justice
administration, and the fate of individual criminal defendants
are all bubbling merrily about. 5 Moreover, the transformation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from a binding to a purely
advisory system has not merely been the source of countless
procedural wrangles and the fodder for a long cerebral feast, but
it has unquestionably altered thousands of individual sentencing
outcomes.6 And yet, from the points of view of federal defendants
v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 709-10, 712-13 (2008) (holding that Rule 32(h) of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to every sentence that was at variance with
the recommended Federal Sentencing Guidelines range); Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (holding that where drug traffickers dealing in crack cocaine were
subject to same criminal sentence as those dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine,
cocaine Guidelines are held to be advisory only); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007) (holding that federal courts of appeals are required to review all federal criminal
sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard); Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence within the recommended Federal Sentencing
Guidelines); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274 (2007) (holding that California's
determinate sentencing law violates a defendant's right to trial by jury safeguarded by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15-16
(2005) (holding that a sentencing court, in inquiring under the Armed Career Criminal
Act of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is not permitted to look to police reports or complaint
applications).
3. A Westlaw search for "543 U.S. 220" in the database for federal appellate
decisions (CTA) conducted on January 17, 2014, produced a list of more than 10,000
documents. The same search in the database for federal district court opinions produced
8,513 documents.
4. A Westlaw search for "543 U.S. 220" or "125 S. Ct. 738" in the database for law
journal articles (JLR) conducted on April 1, 2014, produced a list of 2,257 articles citing
the Booker decision and 224 articles with Booker in the title.
5. For one survey of the Booker terrain, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How
the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be
Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 429-30 (2010) [hereinafter Bowman, Debacle] (exploring
how the merits and remedial opinions in Booker offered an opportunity to improve federal
sentencing procedures).
6. Supra text accompanying notes 3-4 (highlighting the numerous cases and
journal articles discussing Booker); see Adam K. Miller, A New System of Federal
Sentencing: The Impact on Third Circuit Sentencing Procedure in the Wake of the
Supreme Court's Landmark Decision in United States v. Booker, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1107,
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in the mass and of the system that processes them from arrest to
prison gate, perhaps the most surprising fact about Booker is just
how small an effect it has actually had. This Article examines the
tenacity of the Sentencing Guidelines regime and considers its
implications for those who practice in the federal courts and
those who aspire to change federal sentencing outcomes.
II. BOOKER AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The twisted tale of Booker and its progeny is formally about
exposition of the jury trial right in the Sixth Amendment. But
the real issue has always been whether the Court would succeed
in using the Sixth Amendment lever to destabilize and ultimately
topple a federal sentencing regime founded by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) and based on an interlocking set of
sentencing guidelines and statutory mandatory minimum
sentences, 7 a regime widely criticized by the defense bar and
many in the judiciary and the academy for being unduly
inflexible and unremittingly harsh.8 Given the ubiquity of this
critique and the Supreme Court's evisceration of the Guidelines'
legal status, one would have expected that nine years after
Booker a whole new world would have dawned. After all, in order
to maintain the (doubtful) intellectual consistency of its Booker
holding, the Court has been obliged to declare the Guidelines a
hitherto unknown form of nonlaw.9
1110-11, 1121 (2006) (examining statistical changes to federal sentences in the Third
Circuit post-Booker).
7. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 383, 418-28 (contending that the federal
judiciary's experience with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines drove the Sixth
Amendment debate that produced Blakely and Booker).
8. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOst A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 3, 5 (1998) (describing the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines as "almost a parody"); Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 419 (describing the
system as "the most ... restrictive set of sentencing mechanisms ever devised").
9. See Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 434-41, 444-47 (describing how Booker
and its progeny have transformed the Guidelines into rules with the appearance of law,
but without law's normal attributes); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Michael T. Light, The Stability
of Case Processing and Sentencing Post.Booker, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 143, 145-48
(2010) (explaining how the Court clarified the meaning of advisory guidelines after the
Booker decision through subsequent cases); Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing
Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 187 (2007)
(highlighting the intellectual complexity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including
the concept of non-law); see also United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) ('The
sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases, may depart (either
pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines sentence).");
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 300-01 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming
that due to the majority's decision, the Guidelines range "is now nothing more than a




The fall of the Guidelines began with the Court's 2004
decision in Blakely v. Washington,10  which voided the
Washington state sentencing guidelines on the ground that they
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by requiring a
judicial finding of a non-element fact as a prerequisite for certain
upward adjustments of the guideline range or for sentences
above such ranges.11 This decision placed the validity of the
Sentencing Guidelines in grave doubt. 12 A year later, the Booker
merits majority found the Guidelines unconstitutional, 13 but the
Booker remedial majority voided only two subsections of the
SRA-18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which "requires sentencing courts
to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range (in
the absence of circumstances that justify a departure)," 14 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e), which sets forth standards of review on appeal
for sentences imposed under the Guidelines 15 -and then
substituted its own standard of appellate review-that of
"reasonableness"-for the standard in excised Section 3742(e). 16
Thereafter, in Rita v. United States,17 the Court found that a
sentence within a properly calculated guideline range could not
be treated by sentencing judges as presumptively correct, but
could, though it need not, be treated by appellate courts as
presumptively reasonable.18 Then, in 2007, in Kimbrough v.
United States, the Court found that a district court could justify a
sentence outside a properly calculated guideline range based on
the judge's disagreement with the policy judgments of the
Sentencing Commission undergirding a particular guideline. 19
Additionally, in Gall v. United States, the Court found that
appellate courts could not require district courts to provide
justifications for sentences proportional to the extent of
difference between the sentence imposed and the guideline
range, because such a requirement comes "too close to creating
10. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 429 (describing observers' suspicions before
Booker that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines conflicted with the new rule in Blakely).
11. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 303-05 (2004) (affirming that the
"statutory maximum" refers to the maximum sentence a judge may impose upon
conviction without additional findings of fact).
12. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System
Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217,
220-22 (2004) (describing how the Blakely holding put the constitutionality of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in doubt).
13. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012); Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-62.
16. Booker, 543 U.S at 260-62.
17. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
18. Id. at 341, 353-54.
19. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
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an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences
outside the Guidelines range." 20
The upshot of these opinions has been that, although post-
Booker sentencing judges remain obligated to find all the same
facts and apply all the same Guidelines rules to determine a
legally correct guideline range as they did before Booker, they are
now effectively empowered to ignore the results of all this effort
when imposing the actual sentence. 21 Appellate courts can, in
theory, overturn a sentence as "substantively unreasonable,"22
but such reversals are vanishingly rare. 23 In practical fact,
20. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45-47 (2007).
21. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 677
(2006) (describing how after Booker a judge can "thumb his nose" at the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
22. In Booker, the Court held that appellate courts should henceforth review federal
sentences only for "reasonableness." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005). In Rita
v. United States, Justice Scalia, in concurrence, distinguished between what he characterized
as procedural reasonableness review-i.e., review of whether the trial court adhered to the
procedures required to find a correct advisory range under the Guidelines-and substantive
reasonableness review-review of whether the particular sentence imposed was reasonable
based on all the facts and circumstances available to the judge in the sentencing record. Rita,
551 U.S. at 381-84 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia contended that "reasonableness
review cannot contain a substantive component at all." Id. at 370. His view did not command a
majority, then or since, but his nomenclature has stuck. See Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at
444-47 (analyzing Justice Scalia's concurrence).
23. According to U.S. Sentencing Commission data, substantive reasonableness
arguments were made to appellate courts in 1,760 cases in 2011, see U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.59 (2012)
[hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research-and
Statistics/AnnualReports-andSourcebooksl201l/sbtocll.htm, and 1,613 cases in 2012,
see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.59 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.govl
ResearchandStatistics/AnnualReports andSourcebooks/2012/sbtocl2.htm. However,
the Commission's figures show that, in each of these years, appellate courts reversed district
court sentences for substantive unreasonableness in roughly 1% of the cases in which
such arguments were raised on appeal. See 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra, tbl.59; 2012
SOURCEBOOK, supra, tbl.59. The Commission does not list the exact number of cases in
which reversals were secured in a particular year; however, their statistics indicate that,
at a maximum, only sixteen to eighteen defendants out of the more than 80,000 sentenced
each year in federal court, 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra, tbl.1; 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra,
tbl. 1, secure reversal based on the substantive unreasonableness of their sentences.
The actual number appears to be even lower. The Sentencing Resource Counsel
Project of the Federal Public and Community Defenders maintains a list of all sentences
reversed on appeal following the Supreme Court's decision in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). As of December 2013, the list, reproduced below, included only forty-eight cases
decided since Gall in which an appellate court reversed a sentence based on substantive
unreasonableness, which works out to only eight reversals for substantive unreasonableness
per year.
Sentence within range reversed as substantively unreasonable: United States v.
Sanders, 472 F. App'x 376, 381-82 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Wright, 426 F. App'x 412,
417 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 176 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Paul, 561 F.3d 970,
973 (9th Cir. 2009).
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district court judges are now at liberty to adhere to or ignore
guideline ranges as the spirit moves them, subject only to the
requirement that a sentence outside the range be accompanied
by some explanation which (a) is couched in the gloriously
inclusive terminology of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 24, and (b) is not on
Sentence outside range reversed as substantively unreasonable on appeal by
defendant: United States v. Van, No. 12-2322, 2013 WL 5539617, at *2, *4 (6th Cir. Oct.
8, 2013); United States v. Chandler, 732 F.3d 434, 436, 440 (5th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Cruz-Valdivia, 526 F. App'x 735, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Melchor, 515
F. App'x 444, 445, 449-50 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gerezano-Rosales, 692 F.3d
393, 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Esso, 486 F. App'x 200, 201, 203 (2d Cir.
2012); United States v. Aleo, 681 F.3d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Censke,
449 F. App'x 456, 458, 469-71 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Walker, 649 F.3d 511,
512-14 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Worex, 420 F. App'x 546, 547, 550-51 (6th Cir.
2011); United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Calderon-Minchola, 351 F.
App'x 610, 611 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Lopez, 343 F. App'x 484, 485-86 (11th Cir.
2009); United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 532-33, 541, 553 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 39-40, 42, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v.
Ortega-Rogel, 281 F. App'x 471, 472, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2008).
Sentence outside range reversed as substantively unreasonable on appeal by
government: United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1147, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Cole, 721 F.3d 1016, 1019, 1025 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bistline,
720 F.3d 631, 632 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1323, 1326
(11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Robinson,
669 F.3d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 760 (6th Cir.
2012); United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1137 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Christman, 607
F.3d 1110, 1112 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hayes, 383 F. App'x 204, 206, 208 (3d
Cir. 2010); United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 824-25 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d
1274, 1277-79 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 216 (3d Cir.
2009); United States v. Harris, 339 F. App'x 533, 536-37, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. McVay,
294 F. App'x 488, 489-90 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hughes, 283 F. App'x 345,
347, 349 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 221, 269 (4th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hunt, 521
F.3d 636, 639, 641, 650 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 139-40, 176
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (11th Cir. 2008).
24. Section 3553(a) reads as follows:
Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.-The court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
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its face barking mad. 25 For district judges, the Guidelines have
become the legal equivalent of one of the duller and slower-
moving forms of movie zombie--one must take sensible
precautions to avoid being bitten, but they are easily outwitted
and, when troublesome, can be dispatched to oblivion without
legal consequence.
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28,
United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act
of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated
by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of
title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any
amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title
28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement-
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title
28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy
statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under
section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
In effect, Section 3553(a) tells sentencing judges that they are to take into
account all of the general factors and theories that are traditionally thought relevant to
setting a punishment-just deserts, deterrence, crime control, rehabilitation, restitution,
rough equality of outcomes among similarly situated offenders-in addition to the
particular sentencing range prescribed by application of the Guidelines. Since the Booker
line voided Section 3553(b), which gave the Guidelines strongly presumptive effect, and
decreed that the Guidelines, which were designed to impose order and directionality on
this m6lange of concepts, may not be given any more weight than any other consideration,
the result is that the factors listed in Section 3553(a) can now, quite plausibly, be enlisted
to justify virtually any sentencing outcome.
25. Formally, the Supreme Court has equated review of a sentence for
reasonableness with an abuse of discretion standard. Rita, 551 U.S. at 360-61 (Stevens,
J., concurring). But given that, as noted above, supra note 23, appellate courts now
reverse only eight out of the more than 80,000 sentences imposed annually for
substantive unreasonableness; it is plain that a sentencing judge must now abuse his
discretion to a degree approaching lunacy before appellate intervention is likely.
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III. BOOKER AND THE SEVERITY REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
Given the widespread and vocal unhappiness with the
harshness of Guidelines sentencing rules, one would have
expected the declaration that the Guidelines were really and
truly advisory to be followed by an immediate and sustained
decline in the severity of sentences imposed on federal
defendants. 26 Yet, while there has certainly been some movement
in that direction, careful examination of the underlying statistics
reveals that it has been surprisingly limited.
Figure 1A: Mean (Average) Federal Sentence (Months):
2000-2012
[Not Counting Probation-Only Cases]
62 9_6- 59:7- 6 0 4
60
58 8559556 - - 5726 4
56 .3539- - -1-53:9----
54 - .3- -- -A--5
52
50 - II -48
46
Figure 1B: Mean (Average) Sentence Length (Months):
2000-2013
[Counting Probation as Zero Months]
60 46.9 46.8 46.9 47.9 50.1 51.1 8-518 49.6 46.8so 44--.- - -l-m 3-4-3-44-45-




26. See Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight over Controlling Punishments Is
Widely Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (finding praise from those who hoped to
see more lenient sentences and predictions that the Booker decision would allow federal
judges to avoid harsh sentences).
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Figure 2: Median Federal Sentence (Months):
2000-2012
[Not Counting Probation-Only Cases]







As Figures 1A, 27 1B, 28 and 229 illustrate, both the mean
(average) and median federal sentences are now lower than
they were before the 2004-2005 period in which Blakely and
Booker were decided. Interestingly, however, mean and
median sentence lengths actually increased in 2006 and 2007,
beginning their decline only after the December 2007
Kimbrough and Gall opinions in which the Court made clear
that the Guidelines were really and truly advisory. 30 Moreover,
while the mean sentence (whether calculated with or without
probationary sentences) and the median sentence have
dropped by a not inconsiderable seven months below their
previous highs, the mean and median federal sentences are
still only three to six months lower than they were in the early
27. The data in Figure 1A are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 14 (reporting
mean and median length of imprisonmnent for federal defendants, excluding sentences of
probation, home confinement, or other nonprison alternatives).
28. The data in Figure 1B are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMMN, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 13 (reporting
mean and medial length of sentence for federal defendants, counting sentences of
probation as zero months). The data in Figure 1B are also derived from the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's Preliminary Quarterly Data Report for the fourth quarter of
2013. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 4TH QUARTER
RELEASE tbl.19 (2014) [hereinafter 4TH QTR. RELEASE], available at http://www.ussc.gov!
Data-and-Statistics/Federal-Sentencing-Statistics/Quarterly-Sentencing-UpdatesfUSSC
_2013_QuarterReport_4th.pdf.
29. The data in Figure 2 are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMMN, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 14.
30. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 46 (2007); supra Figures 1A, 1B, 2.
DEAD LAW WALKING
2000s, when the outcry against the Guidelines' asserted
severity was at fever pitch. 31 And, the decline in mean
sentence length has now reversed, with a one-month upward
tick in 2012 and another in 2013, while median sentences have
remained flat for the last three years (2010-2012). Thus, the
trend lines in Figures 1 and 2 already suggest a far more
nuanced story than the standard tale in which the Guidelines
placed morally outraged judges in an intolerable legal
straightjacket, from which Booker released them to frolic freely
in the sunshine of enlightened and merciful discretion-Glory
Hallelujah!
On the one hand, both common sense and available
statistics suggest that increased judicial sentencing discretion
post-Booker has produced lower sentences in a large and
growing number of cases. Figure 332 illustrates the steady
post-Booker increase in the percentage of cases sentenced
outside the applicable guideline range. Given that the
proportion of sentences above the applicable guideline range
has never been greater than roughly 2%,33 the steady rise in
outside-the-range sentences equates to a steady increase in
below-range sentences, which should be driving down average
sentence length. Indeed, as Figures 4A 34 and 4B 35 show, there
is an apparent inverse correlation between increased judicial
sentencing discretion and sentence severity-the more judges
diverge from the Guidelines, the lower the average sentence
seems to fall.
31. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 19, 26-29 (2003) (finding widespread criticisms of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
across the legal community).
32. The data in Figure 3 are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26. The data
in Figure 3 are also derived from the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Preliminary
Quarterly Data Report for the fourth quarter of 2013. 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28,
tbl.4.
33. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, fig.G; 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28, tbl.1.
34. The data in Figure 4A are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls. 14-16.
35. The data in Figure 4B are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.13, 26. The
data in Figure 4B are also derived from the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Preliminary
Quarterly Data Report for the fourth quarter of 2013. 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28,
tbl.2, 19.
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On the other hand, if one looks below the surface of the gross
averages, a more complex story immediately emerges. First,
given that a common charge against the Guidelines' regime has
been that it produces more prison terms and fewer sentences of
probation or mixed sentences combining incarceration with other
sanctions, one would have expected that Booker's manumission of
federal judges would have generated an upwelling of
probationary or mixed sentences. In fact, the reverse has been
true. As Figure 536 shows, the proportion of prison-only sentences
has been creeping steadily upward for over a decade, and neither
Booker nor the Gall/Kimbrough duo seems to have affected this
trend at all.














Second, the decline in the average federal sentence is plainly
being driven to an important degree by changes in the mix of
cases prosecuted in federal courts, as opposed to a general
decrease in the sentences of similarly situated defendants. In
particular, as Figure 637 illustrates, the movement of average
federal sentences in the post-Booker period correlates inversely
with the percentage of relatively low-sentence immigration cases
in the overall population of federal defendants. Fiscal Year (FY)
2008 was the year in which Kimbrough and Gall took effect and
fully liberated federal judges to vary from the Guidelines at
36. The data in Figure 5 are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.16 and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's Preliminary Quarterly Data Report for the fourth quarter
of 2013.
37. The data in Figure 6 are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbls.3, 14.
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will.38 But more importantly it saw the beginning of a huge
upsurge in the number of immigration cases, which went from
17,592, or 24.2% of all federal cases, in 200739 to roughly 30,000,
or 34.5% of all cases, in 2011. 40 Given that, in 2011, the average
sentence for an immigration case was sixteen months-as
compared to seventy months for drug trafficking, eighty-three
months for firearms, and twenty-three months for fraud41-the
downward pressure exerted by the rising tide of immigration
cases on the federal average sentence was immense. And the
data for FY 2012 provide a lovely, if brief, indication that the
reverse may also be true. When the percentage of immigration
cases fell from 34.5% in 2011 to 31.5% in 2012,42 the length of the
average federal sentence dutifully ticked right back up from fifty-
two to fifty-three months.43
Figure 6: Relation of Average Federal Sentence to
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Third, and most importantly, there exists direct evidence
that, within offense types, defendants sentenced since Booker are
not faring all that much differently than those sentenced before
that supposed earthquake. To begin, it appears that changes in
38. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
39. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.3 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 SOURCEBOOK], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research and-Statistics/AnnualReportsandSourcebooks/2007/sbt
oc07.htm.
40. 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, tbl.3.
41. Id. tbl.13.
42. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, tbl.3.
43. Compare 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, tbl.14 (reporting the number of
immigration cases and average sentence imposed), with 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
23, tbl.14 (reporting a lower percentage of immigration cases and higher average
sentences than in 2011).
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average sentence length are quite specific to offense type. As
Figures 7A 44 and 7B 45 show, since 2007, mean and median drug
trafficking and immigration sentences have declined, but mean
and median sentences for economic crimes and firearms offenses
have increased.
Figure 7A: Average Sentence by Offense Type: 2000-2012
(Months)
---
O All Offenses - Drug Offenses
- -Immigration -- Firearms
- Econ Crime
Figure 7B: Median Sentence by Offense Type: 2000-2012
(Months)
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44. The data in Figure 7A labeled "All Offenses" and "Firearms" are derived from
the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.14. The data labeled "Econ Crim," "Immigration," and "Drug
Offenses" are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.E.
45. The data in Figure 7B labeled "All Offenses" and "Firearms" are derived from
the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.14. The data labeled "Econ Crim," "Immigration," and "Drug
Offenses" are derived from the 2000 through 2012 editions of U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.E.
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The same heterogeneity is observable within general offense
types. As shown in Figure 8, the severity trend lines for average
drug sentences have varied markedly by drug type.









2003 2004, 2004, 2005, 2005, 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Blakely Blakely Booker Booker
t Only cases sentenced under USSG §§2D1.1 (Drug Trafficking), 2D1.2
(Protected Locations), 2D1.5 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise), 2D1.6 (Use of a
Communication), 2D1.8 (Rent/Manage Drug Establishment), or 2D2.1 (Simple
Possession) are depicted in this figure. Additionally, cases with zero months
prison were excluded. Cases missing drug type or sentencing information were
not included in this figure. Data in this figure represent information from the
Commission's ongoing data files; therefore, data points may vary from prior
sourcebooks.
Indeed, perhaps the most notable thing about drug sentences
seven years post-Booker is how little they have changed. As
indicated in Figure 9 below, a comparison of sentences in 2003, the
last full year before the Blakely-Booker shake-up, with those in
2012 shows that the mean (average) sentences of powder cocaine,
heroin, and marijuana offenders have actually increased in the last
decade, as have the median sentences for heroin and marijuana.
Mean sentences for crack cocaine and methamphetamine cases
have declined, but the drop for methamphetamine has been only 4.3
months. 47  Median sentences for crack cocaine and
methamphetamine fell, albeit by only three months for
methamphetamine, but median powder cocaine sentences have held
46. Figure 8 is a reproduction of 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, fig.L.
47. Infra Figure 9.
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exactly flat at sixty months throughout the era of revived judicial
sentencing discretion.48 In short, the only class of drug offenses that
has seen a significant and sustained decline in sentence length over
the last decade has been crack cocaine. Not coincidentally, crack is
the only drug type as to which both the applicable guidelines and
the governing statute have been amended to reduce the prescribed
sentences. The Sentencing Commission reduced guideline sentences
for crack effective November 1, 2007, 49 and subsequently made
those reductions retroactive for offenses occurring before that
date. 50 In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which
raised the quantities of crack triggering five- and ten-year
mandatory sentences, 51 thus reducing average sentences further.
As illustrated in Figure 8, the progression of the thirty-month drop
in average crack sentence since 2007 corresponds exactly to the
actions of the Commission and Congress. The average cocaine
sentence was near its all-time peak level in 2007, but dropped
precipitously in 2008, then leveled off, and then began a renewed
decline beginning in 2010.52
Figure 953









The stasis in sentence length for drugs other than crack, and
the rise in average sentence for heroin and marijuana, could
48. Infra Figure 9.
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app.C, amends. 705, 706, 711 (2013).
50. See United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2008) (giving effect to
the Sentencing Commission's decision to make retroactive the reduction in sentences for
crack offenses).
51. Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2012)).
52. Supra Figure 8.
53. The data in Figure 9 are taken from U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.J (2004) [hereinafter 2003 SOURCEBOOK, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ResearchandStatistics/AnnualReports andSourcebooks/2003/ar0
3toc.htm; 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note, 23, at fig.J.
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conceivably be the result of government behavior, which has offset
increasing discretionary lenity by judges. For example, post-Booker
prosecutors might be bringing cases with ever-rising drug
quantities, or insisting on pleas to ever-larger amounts, to offset
ever-increasing judicial leniency. But the data will not support that
hypothesis. Because the offense level in drug cases is driven almost
exclusively by the type and quantity of drug, a significant change in
prosecutorial charging or plea bargaining practice on quantity
should be reflected in the average guideline range for drug cases
generally, and more particularly in the average guideline range
within cases involving a particular drug type. As Figure 10
indicates, the average guideline minimum for drug cases has
fluctuated slightly from quarter to quarter over the last five years,
but the overall trend line is flat to slightly down. The same is true
within drug type. From FY 2008 through FY 2012, the average
guideline minimum for methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana
cases has remained almost exactly flat, 54 meaning that the average
drug quantity per case within each drug type has stayed uncannily
constant. 55
That being said, the statistical relationship that best illustrates
the tenacity of the Guidelines as determinants of actual sentences-
both as to federal defendants generally and as to defendants in
particular offense types-is the difference between the average
54. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK FACTS: METHAMPHETAMINE TRAFFICKING
OFFENSES (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/QuickFactsQuickFacts_
Methamphetamine.pdf (noting that the average guideline minimum for
methamphetamine traffickers remained "consistently between 121 and 122 months" from
2008-2012, and that the average sentence imposed "decreased from 98 to 92 months");
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK FACTS: HEROIN TRAFFICKING OFFENSES (2012),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Quick-Facts/QuickFactsHeroinTrafficking.pdf (noting
that the average guideline minimum for heroin traffickers remained stable at
approximately 90 months from 2008-2012, and that the average sentence imposed
"averaged around 69 months during that period"); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK
FACTS: MARIJUANA TRAFFICKING OFFENSES (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Quick Facts/QuickjFactsMarijuanaTrafficking.pdf (noting that the average guideline
minimum for marijuana traffickers was "consistently between 40 and 43 months" from
2008-2012, and that the average sentence imposed "was consistently between 33 and 35
months").
55. One disconcerting implication of this reality, at least for those who support vigorous
criminal law responses to drug trafficking, is that federal antidrug efforts seem to be having
virtually zero effect on the supply side of illegal drug markets. Despite the incarceration of
roughly 25,000 new defendants each year in the federal system alone, the same number of
people moving the same quantities of the same drugs are caught by federal agents year after
year. Compare 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, tbl.33 (showing 25,367 persons sentenced for
federal drug offenses in FY 2012), with 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 53, tbl.33 (showing
26,023 persons sentenced for federal drug offenses in FY 2003). Of course, it may be that,
absent federal efforts, there would be more people trafficking in more drugs, but even if so, it
appears that the effectiveness of federal drug enforcement has reached something close to its
irreducible practical limits.
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guideline minimum and the average sentence imposed. 56 The
guideline minimum/actual sentence differential shows how far the
sentencing results produced by the interactions of judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other system actors deviate
from the norm prescribed by the Guidelines. 57 Figures 10-14 below
chart the guideline minimum/actual sentence differential, quarter
by quarter, from the Gall and Kimbrough decisions in December
2007 through 2013 for all cases (Figure 10), and for the major
subcategories of federal offense: drugs (Figure 11), firearms (Figure
12), alien smuggling (Figure 13), and economic crime cases (Figure
14).58
Figure 10: Average Sentence Length and Average
Guideline Minimum Quarterly Data for All Casest
in Months for Fiscal Years 2008-201359
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FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
t Cases with guideline minimums of life orprobation were included in the guideline minimum
average computations as 470 months and zero months, respectively. In turn, cases with sentences
of 470 months or greater (including life) or probation were included in the sentence average
computations as 470 months and zero months, respectively. In addition, the information
presented in this table includes time of confinement as described in USSG § 5C1.1. Guideline
minimums account for applicable statutory mandatory penalties. Descriptions of variables used
in this figure are provided in Appendix A
56. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text (comparing the average guideline
minimum and the average sentence imposed within select offenses as well as all offenses).
57. See infra Figures 10-14 (depicting the spread between the average guideline
minimum sentences and the average sentences actually imposed by federal courts).
58. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 85 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 38 (2007); infra Figures 10-14.
59. Figure 10 is a reproduction of 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28, fig.C. This Figure
utilizes data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fourth quarter preliminary cumulative
data (October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013).
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Figure 11: Average Sentence Length and Average
Guideline Minimum Quarterly Data for § 2D1.1 Offenders
(Unlawful Drug Trafficking or Manufacturing)t






FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
t Figure includes only cases with a primary sentencing guideline of USSG § 2D1.1 (Unlawful
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to
Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy). Cases with guideline minimums of life or
probation were included in the guideline minimum average computations as 470 months and
zero months, respectively. In addition, the information presented in this table includes time of
confinement as described in USSG §5C1.1. Guideline minimums account for applicable
statutory mandatory penalties. Descriptions of variables used in this figure are provided in
Appendix A
60. Figure 11 is a reproduction of 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28, fig.H. This
Figure utilizes data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fourth quarter preliminary




Figure 12: Average Sentence Length and Average
Guideline Minimum Quarterly Data for § 2K2.1 Offenders
(Unlawful Possession of or Transaction in Firearms)





FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
t Figure includes only cases with a primary sentencing guideline of USSG § 2K2.1 (Unlawful
Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms and Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions
Involving Firearms or Ammunition). Cases with guideline minimums of life or probation were
included in the guideline minimum average computations as 470 months and zero months,
respectively. In turn, cases with sentences of 470 months or greater (including life) or probation
were included in the sentence average computations as 470 months and zero months, respectively.
In addition, the information presented in this table includes time of confinement as described in
USSG § 5C1.1. Guideline minimums account for applicable statutory mandatory penalties.
Descriptions of variables used in this figure are provided in Appendix A
61. Figure 12 is a reproduction of 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28, fig.E. This
Figure utilizes data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fourth quarter preliminary
cumulative data (October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013).
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Figure 13: Average Sentence Length and Average
Guideline Minimum Quarterly Data for § 2L1.1 Offenders
(Alien Smuggling)t
in Months for Fiscal Years 2008-201362
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FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
t Figure includes only cases with a primary sentencing guideline of USSG § 2L1.1 (Smuggling,
Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien). Cases with guideline minimums of life or
probation were included in the guideline minimum average computations as 470 months and
zero months, respectively. In turn, cases with sentences of 470 months or greater (including life) or
probation were included in the sentence average computations as 470 months and zero months,
respectively. In addition, the information presented in this table includes time of confinement as
described in USSG § 5C1. 1. Guideline minimums account for applicable statutory mandatory
penalties. Descriptions of variables used in this figure are provided in Appendix A
62. Figure 13 is a reproduction of 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28, fig.F. This
Figure utilizes data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fourth quarter preliminary
cumulative data (October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013).
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Figure 14: Average Sentence Length and Average
Guideline Minimum Quarterly Data for § 2B1.1 Offenders
(Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud)t
in Months for Fiscal Year 2008-201363
50
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FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
t Figure includes only cases with a primary sentencing guideline of USSG § 2B1.1 (Larceny,
Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage
or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments
Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligation of the United States). Additionally, cases with an
amendment year prior to 2001 were excluded from this figure because prior to this time fraud
cases were reported as USSG §2F1.1. Cases with guideline minimums of life or probation were
included in the guideline minimum average computations as 470 months and zero months,
respectively. In turn, cases with sentences of 470 months or greater (including life) or probation
were included in the sentence average computations as 470 months and zero months, respectively.
In addition, the information presented in this table includes time of confinement as described in
USSG § 5C1.1. Guideline minimums account for applicable statutory mandatory penalties.
Descriptions of variables used in this figure are provided in Appendix A
Given that judges now operate in an advisory regime, which
gives them nearly unbounded discretion to embrace or reject
guideline sentences, these charts suggest several conclusions.
The most fundamental is that the judiciary has decidedly not
enlisted in a broad-gauge revolt against the severity levels
prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. Figure 10 shows two
things. First, the actual average sentence for all cases is always
lower than the average guideline minimum, which is wholly
unsurprising because throughout the Guidelines era the majority
63. Figure 14 is a reproduction of 4TH QTR. RELEASE, supra note 28, fig.D. This
Figure utilizes data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fourth quarter preliminary
cumulative data (October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013).
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of sentences imposed within the range have been at the lower
end of that range64 and some significant proportion of all
defendants (ranging from about one-quarter in the early years 65
to nearly half in 201266) have always been sentenced below the
applicable range. Second, from 2008-2013, the two
measurements moved in nearly perfect tandem, with only a very
slight broadening of the guideline minimum/actual sentence
differential in this period. Figure 11 reveals the same pattern for
drug cases, including the same very modest increase in guideline
minimum/actual sentence differential. Figures 12 and 13 show
the guideline minimums and actual sentences in firearm and
immigration cases moving in almost-perfect lockstep, with less of
a differential and no increase in differential over time. What is so
striking about these figures is that, for three of the four most
common case types in federal court, the system seems to be in
rough equilibrium, comfortable with imposing sentences at a
modest and fairly standard discount from the sentences called for
by the Guidelines and producing average sentences only
fractionally lower than those imposed before Booker. 67
The only anomalous case type is economic crime (Figure 14),
in which the average guideline minimum has increased steadily,
from under twenty months to over thirty months, while the
average sentence imposed has risen only slightly, from about
nineteen months in FY 2008 to about twenty-three months in
2013. Simultaneously, the guideline minimum/actual sentence
differential for economic crime has roughly quadrupled, from
perhaps two months to roughly eight. These figures-and the
Sentencing Commission's reaction to them-hold several possible
lessons, one encouraging, another less so.
The encouraging lesson stems from the fact that the
Commission is acutely aware of the degree of divergence between
actual sentences and guideline prescriptions in the economic
64. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.H (1998) (showing that a majority of defendants in every
major crime category sentenced within the guideline range were sentenced either to the
guideline minimum or within the bottom half of the range); 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 23, fig.H (showing that a majority of defendants in every major crime category
sentenced within the guideline range were sentenced either to the guideline minimum or
within the bottom half of the range).
65. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 156 (1994) (reporting
that in FY 1993, 23.5% of all sentences were downward departures).
66. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, tbl.N (reporting that 45.6% of all sentences
were imposed below the guideline range).
67. Id. at fig.A; see also supra Figures 1A, 1B, 2 (depicting only a modest decline in
average and median sentences imposed after Booker); supra Figures 11-13 (reflecting




crime area. In September 2013, the Commission held a
symposium in New York to consider the principle complaints
about the primary economic crime guideline, § 2B1.1, 68 and it is
actively studying revisions to that Guideline. 69 If the Commission
is successful in crafting and passing amendments that address
the valid complaints about economic crime sentencing to the
satisfaction of the primary stakeholders in the federal sentencing
system, that will represent a signature success for one of the
often-heard arguments in favor of the post-Booker advisory
system, namely that allowing judges greater latitude to diverge
from the guideline range generates valuable feedback in response
to which beneficial changes to the Guidelines can be made. 70
The more troubling part of the economic crime story is that
some aspects of the judiciary's revolt against these guidelines
may be ill-considered. As I have detailed elsewhere, § 2B1.1 has
been repeatedly amended throughout the Guidelines period to
increase the prescribed sentences for a broad swath of economic
crime offenders. 71 This process accelerated markedly when the
Sentencing Commission's Economic Crime Package of 2001,
which designedly raised sentences for mid-to-high level white
collar offenders, was followed by a series of additional increases
compelled by congressional directives in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002.72 The result was a sentencing structure that prescribes
unprecedented multi-decade sentences for the relatively few
defendants convicted of crimes that caused losses in the tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars-sentences longer than those
customarily imposed on bank robbers and even murderers. 73
Indeed, in these very big cases, Guidelines calculations routinely
produce offense levels that significantly exceed forty-three, and
are therefore, quite literally, off the top of the Guidelines chart,
on which an offense level of forty-three equals life
68. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SYMPOSIUM OF ECONOMIC CRIME (2013),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research andStatistics/Research_-Projects/Economic_
Crimes/20130918-19_Symposium/Transcript-of-Symposium-on-Economic-Crime.pdf.
69. Notice of Final Priorities, 78 Fed. Reg. 51,820 (Aug. 21, 2013).
70. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 279, 321-23 (2006).
71. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 426-30
(2004).
72. Id.
73. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006); Frank 0. Bowman,




imprisonment. 74 It is thus hardly remarkable that judges would
balk at literal application of obviously ill-considered rules for
these extraordinary cases. 75 However, the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
structure also raised sentences for those outside of the financial
criminal elite, but by not nearly so much. For example, in 2012,
the average guideline minimum for a defendant whose crime
caused a loss of between $400,000 and $1 million was forty-one
months, and for losses of $1 million to $2.5 million, it was fifty-
three months, or not quite four-and-one-half years. 76 Yet it
appears that judges are routinely declining to impose Guidelines
sentences even at these far lower levels. 77 In that regard,
consider Figures 15 through 17 below.
Figure 15 shows that 83% of cases sentenced under the
fraud guideline involve losses of less than $1 million, and about
91% involve losses of less than $2.5 million. Figure 16 shows the
difference between the minimum guideline sentence and the
average imposed sentence for each guideline loss amount
category. Figure 17 shows, for each guideline loss category, the
proportion of sentences imposed within the range, above the
range, below the range because the government recommended
that result, or below the range because a judge lowered the
sentence absent a government recommendation. Taken together,
these charts tell a remarkable story. In sum, beginning at the low
end with cases in which at least $70,000 was stolen and the
average guideline minimum was only twenty-one months, and
running up to cases in which the loss ranged from $1 million to
$2.5 million and the average guideline minimum was fifty-three
months, judges imposed below-range sentences at least 60% of
the time. 78 And in one-quarter to one-third of these cases, judges
did so on their own initiative and despite the absence of any
government suggestion that leniency was warranted. 79 Even in
cases where the defendant stole more than $1 million and the
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A; Bowman, supra note 73, at 168;
Allen Stanford Sentenced to 110 Years in Prison for Orchestrating $7 Billion Investment Fraud
Scheme, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Jun. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/Junel12-
crm-756.html.
75. Bowman, supra note 73, at 169-70 (providing numerous examples of cases
where judges have granted downward variances below the applicable Guideline range).
76. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2013 SYMPOSIUM ON ECONOMIC CRIME, SENTENCING AND
GUIDELINE APPLICATION INFORMATION FOR §2B1.1 OFFENDERS 7 fig.7 (2013) [hereinafter 2013
SYMPOSIUM ON ECONOMIC CRIME], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research-and Statistics/
Research.ProjectsfEconomicCrimes/20130918-
19_Symposium/SentencingGuideline_ApplicationInfo.pdf.
77. See id. (illustrating the average sentences imposed on § 2B1.1 offenders are
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average guideline minimum was only fifty-three months, judges
were willing to impose a guideline sentence in only 34.7% of the
cases. 8 0
Figure 15: Number of§ 2B1.1 Offenders in
Each Loss Table Category
Fiscal Year 2012 (N = 8,507)81
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Figure 16: Offenders' Average Sentence Length and Average
Guideline Minimum for Each § 2B1.1 Loss Table Category
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Figure 17: Sentence Relative to the Guideline Range
for § 2B1.1 Offenders in Each Loss Table Category
in Months for Fiscal Year 201283
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The judges' increasing resistance to imposing Guidelines
sentences in fraud cases is even more striking when one
considers Figure 18, which shows that the seriousness of cases
filed by federal prosecutors, at least as measured by loss amount,
has more than quadrupled since 2003, from $18,414 to $95,408.84
And in the post-Booker period from 2006 to 2012, the average
loss in cases sentenced under § 2B1.1 more than tripled, but the
mean (average) sentence imposed for fraud cases increased by
less than six months, while the median sentence increased by
only two months.8 5
83. Id. fig.8.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 13 (2007) (reporting the mean fraud sentence in 2006 as 18.6
months, and the median fraud as ten months), with 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23,
tbl. 13 (reporting the mean fraud sentence in 2012 as twenty-four months, and the median
fraud as twelve months).
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This is not to suggest that the Guidelines' current sentence
prescriptions for fraud cases of the middling to moderately
serious variety are set at some Golden Mean from which
widespread downward deviation would be irrational. But it is
equally difficult to characterize current Guidelines sentences for
this broad middle class of cases as irrationally draconian.8 7 As
Figure 16 reveals, the Guidelines now prescribe an average
minimum sentence of about two years and nine months for
someone who steals more than $200,000 and about four years
and five months for someone who steals between $1 million and
$2.5 million. In any particular case these numbers may be too
high or too low, but it seems nearly impossible to deny that, as
benchmark averages, they are squarely within the range that a
rational administrative agency charged with making national
sentencing policy might choose. Yet, as Figure 17 shows, judges
are now adhering to these benchmarks only about a third of the
time, and, as Figure 14 indicates, their disinclination to conform
to the fraud guidelines is growing by the year.
What makes this trend troubling is its uniqueness among
major offense types. As demonstrated above, even after Booker,
judges considering drug, firearm, and immigration cases have, on
average, continued to adhere to the Guidelines to a striking
degree.88 This begs the question of why economic crime should be
86. 2013 SYMPOSIUM ON ECONOMIC CRIME, supra note 76, at 2 fig.2.
87. Id.
88. See supra Figures 7A, 7B (showing the mean and median sentences for the
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different. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that what we are
witnessing is a slow resurgence of the "just like me" class bias in
fraud cases-the reluctance of judges to impose serious
punishment on people who look like themselves, who come from
middle class backgrounds, who are educated and work in
professional settings, and who steal with briefcases (now
computers) rather than guns.89
One of the objectives of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
when first enacted was to reject the then-existing sentencing
consensus among federal judges that white collar crime should be
punished primarily with probation or, at most, with extremely
short periods of confinement. 90 One can fairly argue that the
current Guidelines have gone too far in the other direction. 91 But
there is also a real danger that in the course of trying to fix the
undoubted absurdities embedded in the rules governing the most
serious cases, the Commission will so far relax the rules for
serious offenders of the middling sort that the result will be
acquiescence in the perennial tendency of judges to give undue
leniency to criminals of their own class. "Feedback" is a fine
thing. And feedback from experienced judges is very useful
indeed. But in the end, there is nothing magical about the
opinions of judges. The Commission does not exist merely to reify
judicial preferences in rule form. Rather, it exists to craft rules
that take account of the personal, professional, political, and
moral judgments of all those-including the society at large-
who have a stake in criminal justice.
major offense types); supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing that sentences
imposed for drug, firearm, and immigration cases generally follow the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, even after Booker).
89. Deborah Young, Federal Sentencing: Looking Back to Move Forward, 60 U. CIN.
L. REV. 135, 140-42 (1991) (reviewing STANTON WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN
SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988)).
90. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping With 'Loss" A Re-Examination of Sentencing
Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 484 (1998)
(discussing the Sentencing Commission's early choice to raise white collar sentences);
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 7 n.49 (1988) ("A pre-Guidelines sentence
imposed on [white collar] criminals would likely take the form of straight probationary
sentences.").
91. See, e.g., James E. Felman, The Need to Reform the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for High-Loss Economic Crimes, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 138, 138-40 (2010)
(advocating that the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines are too harsh for high-loss
economic crimes); Erik Luna, Spoiled Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 23, 41 (2011) ("Some contend that white-collar sentencing has become unduly harsh,
while others believe that the punishment is not nearly tough enough.').
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IV. A CAVEAT ON THE EFFECT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCES
The statistics discussed so far apparently describe a federal
sentencing system in which the post-Booker advisory Guidelines
continue to dominate the process by which sentences are decided
and remain remarkably sticky in determining the severity of the
sentences actually imposed. However, the Guidelines themselves
may not be the whole story. It may be that statutory mandatory
minimum sentences are propping up the absolute level of
sentences, and inflating the degree to which judges voluntarily
adhere to the now-advisory Guidelines. 92 The first point is
obvious: if a defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence, the judge must impose it, regardless of whether he or
she would prefer a lower one. 93 Given that more than a quarter of
all federal defendants are subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence, 94 this constraint on judicial discretion may be having a
significant statistical effect.
The second point is perhaps a bit less obvious. It arises from
the fact that the sentence a judge is obliged to impose due to the
presence of a statutory minimum sentence will often look like a
sentence imposed in reliance on the advisory guideline. 95 This
will be especially true in drug cases because mandatory
minimum sentences and the base offense level under the
Guidelines are both determined by drug quantity and the
original Commission set the drug guidelines offense levels to
correspond with the sentence lengths required by the mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes. 96 Thus, if a quantity X of drug Y
triggers a mandatory minimum sentence of sixty months, the
guidelines for drug Y are generally structured so that proof of
quantity X produces a guideline sentencing range of at least sixty
months. 97 In such a case, the judge is bound to impose a sentence
92. Crystal S. Yang, Have Inter-Judge Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2348140.
93. Id.
94. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 120 (2012) (reporting that in FY
2010, "27.2 percent of all cases (19,896 of 73,239 cases) involved a conviction of an offense
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty").
95. Yang, supra note 92.
96. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 377, 419, 430 n.316; see Special Report to the
Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N (Aug. 1991), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_andPublicAffairs/
CongressionalTestimony-andReports/MandatoryMinimumPenalties/199108_RtCMa
ndatoryMinimum.htm.
97. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 377, 419, 430 n.316.
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of at least sixty months, regardless of his or her views of the
"reasonableness" of such a sentence, because Booker made the
Guidelines advisory but did not void mandatory minimum
statutes. 98 Therefore, post-Booker there are doubtless a number
of cases each year in which the judge imposes the sentence
required by a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, a
sentence that is within the applicable guideline range and which
therefore shows up on statistics as a within-range sentence, but
in which, absent the mandatory minimum, the judge would have
imposed a lower, non-Guidelines sentence.
The constraint imposed by mandatory minimums may soon
be relaxed, at least somewhat. On August 12, 2013, Attorney
General Eric Holder issued a memorandum changing
Department of Justice charging policy with respect to mandatory
minimum sentences. 99 The memorandum combines a moderation
of the Justice Department's views on the desirability of
mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases with a procedural
artifact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alleyne v.
United States'00 to produce a new regime in which line
prosecutors are expressly empowered to eliminate mandatory
minimum sentences in a potentially significant number of drug
cases. 101
Alleyne held that facts such as drug quantity that trigger a
mandatory minimum sentence must now be treated as elements
of the crime which must be pled in the indictment and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 102 Before Alleyne, if the facts
disclosed at sentencing established a drug quantity sufficient to
trigger a mandatory minimum, the judge could (and indeed was
obliged to) find that quantity and apply it to the mandatory
minimum sentence, regardless of what was pled in the
indictment or advocated by the prosecutor. 10 3 After Alleyne,
unless the prosecutor alleges the trigger quantity in the
indictment and later proves it at trial or secures an admission to
98. Bowman, supra note 70, at 304; Yang, supra note 92 (noting that "a mandatory
minimum that exceeds the Guidelines recommended minimum trumps the Guidelines").
99. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., to United States Attorneys and
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Re: Department Policy on Charging
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases 1-3
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-
mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf
[hereinafter Holder Memo].
100. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Holder Memo, supra note 99, at
1-3.
101. Holder Memo, supra note 99, at 1-3.
102. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162-63.
103. Id. at 2157.
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it by the defendant as part of a plea, the mandatory minimum
cannot be applied. Because a prosecutor can elect not to plead or
prove the trigger amount, even in a case where the facts plainly
support it, the effect of Alleyne is to place the application of
mandatory minimum sentences even more completely within the
discretionary power of prosecutors.
Some would argue that prosecutors already controlled the
application of mandatory minimums before Alleyne, since they
could, and sometimes did, agree not to produce evidence in
support of triggering quantities of drugs. However, prior to the
Obama Administration, Justice Department policy declared that
prosecutors were obliged in all but the most unusual case to
charge and accept a plea to nothing less than the "most serious,
readily provable offense." 10 4 And prior to Alleyne, the judge was
obliged to find the facts regarding mandatory minimums based
on the evidence before him regardless of the contents of the
pleadings. 10 5 Now prosecutors can prevent application of a
mandatory minimum simply by omitting an allegation of drug
quantity from the indictment.106 This new procedural wrinkle
has somewhat less practical reach than first appears because
federal mandatory minimum sentence statutes in the drug area
almost universally tie proof of a triggering drug amount to an
increase in both the minimum and maximum available
sentence. 10 7 Under the rule of Blakely v. Washington, any fact
raising the statutory maximum sentence must be pled and
proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant. 08 Thus, even
before Alleyne, prosecutors who wanted a quantity-based drug
minimum to apply were obliged to plead and prove the trigger
amount because proof of that amount would also raise the
statutory maximum. 109 Accordingly, the real news in the Holder
104. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors
(Sept. 22, 2003), http:l/www.justice.gov/opalpr/2003/September/03_ag-516.htm.
105. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (describing the pre-Alleyne view that "judicial
factfinding that increased the mandatory minimum did not implicate the Sixth
Amendment").
106. Holder Memo, supra note 99, at 2.
107. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 5, at 430 n.316; see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, DRUG PRIMER 1-2 (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/LegallPrimers/Primer_- Drug.pdf
(stating that the "minimum and maximum statutory penalties [for drug offenses] are
driven by the type and the quantity of the drug involved").
108. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 303-04, 313 (2004).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934 (8th Cir. 2000)
(overruling Circuit precedent that drug quantity was a sentencing factor that could be found
using a preponderance of the evidence standard); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766,
767-69 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Based upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey... we conclude that drug quantity must often be treated as an element of the offense
under § 841 but that any error was harmless in this case because the indictment charged
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memo is not so much that prosecutors have a new discretionary
mechanism to eliminate mandatory minimums for particular
defendants, but that the Attorney General is encouraging them
to use it in a broad, if so-far loosely defined, swathe of drug
cases. 110 If line prosecutors across the country take the Attorney
General at his word, the number of drug cases with mandatory
minimum sentences is likely to drop appreciably and we may be
on the verge of finding out whether it has been the stickiness of
the Guidelines or the straightjacket of mandatory minimums
that has kept judges roughly compliant with guideline norms in
narcotics cases."'
V. ANOTHER CAVEAT ON DISPARITY
All the observations made so far are grounded in national
statistics, which requires a caveat about the incidence and effect
of regional and inter-judge disparity. Eight years ago, in 2006,
writing for the first University of Houston symposium on the
post-Booker world, I examined the available information on the
question of whether Booker had produced increased sentence
disparities between similarly situated defendants in different
regions. 112 I concluded that the period since Booker was then too
short and the evidence too sparse to arrive at any meaningful
conclusion, 113 but privately I was moderately confident that the
advent of advisory guidelines would in time produce increasing
disparities, both between regions and between defendants
Sheppard with conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams, and the jury made a special
finding of that quantity.'); see also Memorandum from David G. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to
All Federal Prosecutors 2 (May 1, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-memo-sentencing-
cocaine-offenses.pdf.
110. The Holder memo encourages consideration of the following factors:
The defendant's relevant conduct does not involve the use of violence, the
credible threat of violence, the possession of a weapon, the trafficking of drugs to
or with minors, or the death or serious bodily injury of any person; [t]he
defendant is not an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of others within a
criminal organization; [t]he defendant does not have significant ties to large-
scale drug trafficking organizations, gangs, or cartels; and [t]he defendant does
not have a significant criminal history. A significant criminal history will
normally be evidenced by three or more criminal history points but may involve
fewer or greater depending on the nature of any prior convictions.
Holder Memo, supra note 99, at 2.
111. This will be doubly the case if any of several bills relaxing the grip of mandatory
minimum sentences now pending in the Senate were to receive congressional approval.
See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE PAUL-LEAHY "JUSTICE SAFETY VALVE
ACT OF 2013": PREVENTING LIVES AND MONEY FROM BEING LOST DOWN THE DRAIN 2-4
(2013), available at http://famm.org/Repository/Files/Justice%20Safety%20OValve%2Act%
20Primer%20FINAL.pdf.
112. Bowman, supra note 70, at 314-18.
113. Id. at 318.
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sentenced by different judges in the same district or region. In
truth, the post-Booker experience has varied widely depending on
one's district. And while there are those who continue to dispute
or at least downplay the point, the available data strongly
suggests that, and it suggests that there has indeed been an
increase in regional and judge-to-judge disparity. 114 All three
points require some amplification.
A. Different Districts Have Had Very Different Post-Booker
Experiences
A focus on national averages necessarily obscures local
variation. The post-Booker story told by national averages is one
of gradual, incremental change toward an equilibrium somewhat
less punitive, but not terribly different, than the one that
prevailed before anyone conceived that the Sixth Amendment
represented a threat to binding guidelines. But in some districts,
the federal sentencing experience has changed very markedly. As
Figure 19 illustrates, 115 a few districts adhere to the Guidelines
as much or even more than they ever did, while in others the rate
of Guidelines compliance has fallen by 40%-50%. Even in the
pre-Booker era of legally binding guidelines, each federal district
always maintained a slightly different equilibrium between strict
compliance with the rules and various local accommodations.
1 1 6
Since Booker, a new and sometimes quite different set of local
understandings has arisen. 117 Thus, one must be very cautious in
making sweeping national generalizations about the effect of
Booker.
114. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Prolegomenon on the Status of the Hopey, Changey Thing
in American Criminal Justice, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 93, 97 (2010).
115. The data in Figure 19 are drawn from the 2003 and 2013 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app.B.
116. See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly
a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1135 (2001)
(analyzing federal drug sentencing data and hypothesizing that "each judicial district has
tended to create a local equilibrium in which the customary sentencing players ... have
reached accommodations regarding the commonly occurring issues in Guidelines
application"); Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical
Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87
IOWA L. REV. 477, 560 (2002) (concluding that federal sentencing actors have adopted
'local norms and legal folkways, establishing sentencing practices based on Guidelines
rules but full of local idiosyncrasy"); Jawjeong Wu & Cassia Spohn, Interdistrict Disparity
in Sentencing in Three U.S. District Courts, 56 CRIME & DELINQ. 290, 292, 298, 313-15
(2010) (evaluating national inter-district sentencing disparity based on three similar
districts and finding that each district relied on different factors to depart from Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
117. See Yang, supra note 92 (reasoning that inter-district disparity relies in large
part on different political climates across districts).
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Figure 19: Comparison of Percent Sentences in Range by
District:
2003 vs. 2012
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Each black/white pair of bars is one district
B. Regional Disparity Has Increased After Booker
While there can be no doubt that different districts have
responded quite differently to the advent of advisory Guidelines, the
question of whether the sentencing practices of federal districts
have become more or less disparate than they already were before
Booker defies precise quantification. A host of variables complicate
the problem. Differences in geographic and population size,
numbers of defendants, numbers of district judges, mix of case
types, and the like make cross-district comparison dauntingly
complex. Nonetheless, some general conclusions are possible.
First, there is no general consensus among researchers on the
question of whether the advent of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987 reduced unjustifiable regional sentencing
disparities.118 Second, inter-district disparity appears to have
increased since the Guidelines became advisory. I have noted this
trend on several occasions since 2010,119 and the Commission's most
recent figures seem to confirm that it continues. 120
118. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF SENTENCING REFORM 96-97 (2004) (noting that some researchers concluded that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines reduced regional disparity, some found no evidence of such a
reduction, and some found increased regional disparity).
119. Bowman, supra note 114, at 97; Frank 0. Bowman, Im, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix
the Absurd Post.Booker Federal Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 356 (2012)
[hereinafter Bowman, Nothing Is Enough].
120. Compare 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 53, at app.B, with 2012 SOURCEBOOR,
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What one is trying to determine when assessing inter-
district disparity is the degree to which the judges of one district
sentence similarly situated defendants differently from the
judges of another district.121 The Guidelines were designed to
ensure rough parity in sentencing between similarly situated
defendants by identifying factors thought important to sentence
severity (drug quantity, loss amount, degree of injury to victims,
role in the offense, and so forth), assigning numerical values to
those factors, and correlating those numerical values to strongly
presumptive sentencing ranges. 122 Even conceding the many
imperfections in the Guidelines scheme, one useful metric of
inter-district disparity is a comparison of the degree to which
judges in different districts sentence within the applicable
guideline range, i.e., degree to which the district judges treat
similarly those defendants the Guidelines view as similar.
Throughout the Guidelines era, there has always been a
considerable degree of variation among districts in rates of
Guidelines compliance. 123 Nonetheless, a year-to-year increase or
decrease in the degree of inter-district variation is one imperfect,
but respectable, measure of increasing or decreasing disparity in
the sentencing of similarly situated defendants. This is so
because, however much districts may differ from each other at
any given moment in size, case type mix, and so forth, those
factors will tend to remain relatively stable over time within a
single district. 124 Likewise, any significant national trends in
case mix or prosecutorial priorities, such as the big increase in
immigration prosecutions noted above, will tend to affect many
districts and should have relatively little effect on the degree of
inter-district disparity in Guidelines compliance. 125 In short, a
supra note 23, at app.B.
121. See Wu & Spohn, supra note 116, at 294 (suggesting many federal sentencing
disparity studies focus on identifying similarly situated defendants sentenced differently).
122. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A2.2, 2B1.1, 2D1.1, 3B1.1
(2013) (outlining purpose of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, various factors taken into account,
and providing the current sentencing table); id. at ch. 1, pt. A, ch. 5, pt. A (same).
123. See Paula M. Kautt, Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit
Variation in Sentencing Outcomes for Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633,
648, 658 (2002) (providing Federal Sentencing Guidelines-era data to present inter-
district disparity in sentences for drug-trafficking offenses).
124. See generally U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS SEPTEMBER
2013 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx? doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/district-fcms-profiles-september-2013.pdf. The
different U.S. District Courts have relatively consistent numbers of filings every year,
numbers of civil filings per month, and numbers of criminal filings per month. Id. These
numbers are especially consistent within each district when compared with other
districts' numbers. Id.




significant increase in the degree of variation in Guidelines
compliance among districts would suggest, even if standing alone
it cannot conclusively prove, an increase in regionally disparate
sentencing of similarly situated defendants. The data show such
an increase.
The simplest way to illustrate the trend is by comparing
Figures 20A1 26 and 20B,127 which are scatter plots showing the
percentage of cases sentenced within range in every federal
district in 2003, the last statistical year before the Blakely
decision, and 2012, the last statistical year post-Booker for which
data are available. Put simply, we are seeing an increase in
national systemic entropy. As each local system arrives at its
own accommodation between guideline rules and local
preferences, districts are diverging ever further from each other
and from the pre-Booker national norm. The point made visually
manifest in these scatter plots can be expressed statistically by
noting the standard deviation among all federal districts of the
percentage of within-range sentences was 10.28 in 2003 and has
jumped to 13.73 in 2012. Figure 21128 shows graphically that the
standard deviation among districts has increased fairly steadily
since 2006, the first full statistical year following the Booker
decision, and that the rate of increase accelerated beginning in
FY 2008, after the December 2007 Gall and Kimbrough decisions
affirming the genuinely advisory character of the Guidelines. 129
tables/D03CMarO7.pdf, with U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2013
(2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
caseload-statistics-2013.aspx (showing a significant increase in immigration offenses in
at least fifty judicial districts when compared with 2007 data). See also supra text
accompanying notes 39-40.
126. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 53, app.B.
127. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, app.B.
128. The data in Figure 21 are derived from the 2006 through 2012 editions of U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app.B.
129. Several studies have suggested that inter-district sentencing disparities have
not increased in the post-Booker period. Ulmer & Light, supra note 9, at 165-66 ("[I]t
appears that inter-district variation in sentencing has changed little so far as a result of
Booker."); Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Michael T. Light & John Kramer, The 'Liberation' of Federal
Judges' Discretion in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased
Disparity and Divergence Between Courts?, 28 JUST. Q. 799, 816 (2011) (presenting results
that suggest immediately post-Booker "judges were even more reliant on the guidelines").
Although these authors perform far more sophisticated analyses than anything attempted
here, I confess to finding them unconvincing. The 2010 article utilizes only data through
FY 2007, which ended on September 30, 2007, and thus does not examine the behavior of
federal judges in the five fiscal years (FY 2008-FY 2012) after the December 2007 Gall
and Kimbrough decisions in which the Supreme Court made explicit the holding that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were truly advisory and that the sentencing decisions of
district court judges were to be subject to only cursory substantive review by appellate
courts. Ulmer & Light, supra note 9, at 152. The 2011 article only considers data through
the end of FY 2009, Ulmer, Light & Kramer, supra, at 804 n.1, and actually finds a
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statistically significant post-Gall increase in inter-district disparity, id. at 816 tbl.3A, but
judges it insubstantial. However, we now have four more years of post-Gall experience
and it would certainly appear that the observations of Ulmer, Light, and Kramer about
the period through FY 2009 were the beginnings of a continuing trend of increased inter-
district disparity. Indeed, if my rough measure of increased disparity in the form of
increasing standard deviation among district rates of guideline compliance has any
validity, it is from 2010-2012 that disparity really begins to increase most notably.
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The next Part will summarize the copious evidence of disparate
sentencing practices among individual judges. However, it should
be emphasized that the gradual, but steady, divergence among the
sentencing practices of the districts doubtlessly reflects not only
regional differences in judicial behavior, but differences in the
charging and plea bargaining practices of U.S. Attorney's Offices. 130
Indeed, one can predict with reasonable confidence that one effect of
the 2013 Holder memo on mandatory minimum sentences will be
an increase in regional disparity as different prosecutors adopt
different views on who should and should not be subject to
mandatory minimum sentences. 131
C. Inter-Judge Disparity Has Also Increased Since Booker
Despite the lack of consensus on whether legally binding
guidelines reduced regional disparity, researchers both inside
and outside of the U.S. Sentencing Commission concluded that
the Guidelines did reduce sentencing disparity between
individual judges. 3 2 One would therefore expect that Booker's
130. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFrEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 118, at 80
(attributing sentencing disparity to differences among regions and different judges'
philosophies); James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
271, 301 (1999) (describing the strong effect the U.S. Attorney's office and its regional
charging policies have on inter-district sentencing disparity).
131. Holder Memo, supra note 99, at 1 (granting United States prosecutors discretion
on prescribing minimum sentences for "non-serious" drug violations).
132. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 118, at 97-99
(reviewing studies and concluding that "[tihe sentencing guidelines have made significant
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transformation of the Guidelines from binding to advisory would
increase the disparity between sentences imposed by different
judges on similarly situated defendants. Although some have
tried to dispute or at least downplay this point, 133 the weight of
the research is now sufficiently great to preclude serious doubt
that advisory guidelines increase sentencing disparities between
judges.134 This is, of course, hardly a surprising outcome. One of
the primary objectives of the Guidelines was to cabin the exercise
of judicial discretion through the application of mandatory rules
and thus lessen the variability of individual judicial decisions. To
expect that judges freed of legal constraint would sentence with
the same degree of consistency as they did while the constraints
were in place is to assume that the presence or absence of
binding rules has no effect whatever on human decision-making.
D. Does Increasing Disparity Matter?
The real question at the moment is not whether Booker has
increased the disparity between the sentences imposed on
similarly situated federal defendants, because it surely has, but
whether that undeniable increase matters very much. I think it
should matter to anyone who believes that one important
component of a just system of criminal punishment is that
similarly situated offenders are treated substantially similarly.
Particularly in a national system of uniform laws, an offender's
progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion"); Anderson, Kling &
Stith, supra note 130, at 294; Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & R. Barry Ruback, The
Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 296 (1999).
133. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: The 2012 USSC Booker Report: Inter-Judge Differences in
Federal Sentencing, DEFENDERS SERVS. OFFICE, http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics/
sentencing-resources/fact-sheet-on-sentencing-commission's-booker-report-(addressing-
inter-judge-disparity).pdfsfvrsn=4 (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
134. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BooKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 98-104 (2012) (concluding that inter-judge
disparity within districts has increased since Booker); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010) (examining
the sentencing practices of judges in the District of Massachusetts and concluding that
the advent of Booker increased inter-judge disparity); Yang, supra note 92, at 27, 36, 50;
see also Paul J. Hofer, Data, Disparity, and Sentencing Debates: Lessons from the TRAC
Report on Inter-Judge Disparity, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 37, 41 (2012) ("I believe TRAC's
central claim [that different judges impose different sentences on similarly situated
defendants to a statistically significant degree] has been established to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty .... Something about sentencing judges often has an effect
on the sentences they impose.'); Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variations Documented in
Federal Sentencing, TRAC REPORTS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://tracfed.syr.edu/
tracreports/judge/274/ (examining federal sentencing data from FY 2007-FY 2011 and
finding that "the typical sentence handed down by a federal district court judge can be
very different than the typical sentences handed down for similar cases by other judges in
that same district").
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sentence should not be notably dependent on the region in which
the crime was committed or the identity of the judge who imposes
the sentence. 135 Of course, horizontal equity is not the only
important principle of just punishment and one might fairly
conclude that the benefits of increased individualization of
federal sentencing after Booker outweigh the costs flowing from
increased disparity. 136
The other way in which increased post-Booker disparity
matters is that it probably represents the primary political risk
to maintenance of the post-Booker status quo. At present, there is
very little apparent concern among federal political actors about
increased judicial sentencing discretion. 137 If anything, trust in
the wisdom of sentencing judges has become something of an
article of faith on the liberal side of the spectrum and even the
most consistent conservative critics of judicial leniency have been
notably quiet for some time. But this phase, too, will pass in
time. Sooner or later, uncontrolled disparity will again become a
rallying cry.
VI. SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE SURPRISINGLY
TENACIOUS SENTENCING GUIDELINES
So what general observations can one make about these
Guidelines that will not die? Here I will venture only three:
First, an explanatory speculation. The endurance of the
Guidelines, but more particularly the degree to which they
continue to drive actual sentences, has surprised nearly
everyone. It has pleasantly surprised those who liked the old
system (primarily the Justice Department and law and order
conservatives in Congress) and feared that judges, once free of
mandatory Guidelines, would in short order be throwing wide the
prison gates for significant classes of defendants. It has
unpleasantly surprised a good many guideline critics (primarily
the defense bar, the academy, and liberal sentencing reformers)
who privately assumed the same thing. 138  The cognitive
135. See Scott, supra note 134, at 6-7, 28-29 n.167 (arguing that sentencing should
not depend upon the "judge's politics, personality, or biases" and noting that sentence
lengths depend upon the policies of local prosecutors).
136. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After
Booker and Rita, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 79, 84 (2007) (arguing that post-Booker
individualized sentencing outweighs the cost of moderate sentencing inconsistencies).
137. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion and Fairness in
Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 59-60 (2007) (suggesting neither Congress nor the
Sentencing Commission are likely to make any changes to the federal sentencing regime).
138. See Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change,
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 19-21 (2007) (reasoning that district judges' continued adherence
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dissonance among Guidelines critics has been particularly acute
because they have been obliged by their preference for the new
system over the old and their fear of a politically-driven "Booker
fix," to publicly praise post-Booker judges for continuing to
adhere closely to the Guidelines while privately cursing them for
the same thing. 139
Why have the judges stuck to the Guidelines so closely? In
retrospect, I suppose the mystery is whether any of us expected
anything different. Judges are men and women of the law. They
naturally look for rules and endeavor to apply them. However
badly the Supreme Court may have tangled Sixth Amendment
doctrine in Blakely, Booker, and their misbegotten progeny, to
district judges charged with the everyday work of sentencing
federal defendants, the Guidelines still look and feel like "law."
Law with some extra elasticity, perhaps, but still law of a
recognizable sort, which their professional ethos disposes them to
follow. Moreover, this particular body of rules gives guidance in
the one area in which judges are most likely to feel in need of it.
How, after all, does one go about quantifying punishment for
crime? Judges faced with the task are acutely aware of the
inevitable subjectivity of the exercise and are customarily
grateful for standards provided by officially anointed experts,
even if they may not always agree with the experts in particular
cases. 140 Hence, though I suspect that judges' adherence to the
Guidelines will continue to slowly erode, there is no reason to
think that the Guidelines will not remain central to sentencing
decisions indefinitely.
Second, an admonition to practitioners. The Guidelines still
matter. They still matter nearly as much as they did on the day
before Booker was decided. 141 Practice accordingly. Because if you
to sentencing guidelines is irrational and a result of status quo biases); Raymond Moore,
Testimony on Behalf of Federal Public and Community Defenders before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, February 16, 2012, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 376, 376, 378 (2012)
(stating that although making the Guidelines advisory is a step in the right direction,
judges still adhere to the Guidelines too often and are "overly-restrained").
139. See Bowman, Nothing Is Enough, supra note 119, at 358 (discussing "the
surpassingly odd spectacle of folks who spent the first two decades of the guidelines era
vehemently denouncing the guidelines... now mounting an impassioned defense of a
post-Booker system that retains virtually every flaw they previously deplored").
140. See Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of N.H., Statement Before the
United States Sentencing Commission 9-10 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/
LegislativeandPublic Affairs/PublicHearingsandMeetings/20120215-16/Testimony-
16_Barbadoro.pdf (presenting expressions of gratitude from various federal district court
judges for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
141. See id. (presenting many judges who rely heavily on Federal Sentencing
Guidelines post-Booker); Berman, supra note 138, at 20-21 (reasoning that federal judges
still adhere to the post-Booker status quo of guideline sentencing by properly calculating
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do not, your client, whether the government or a defendant, will
suffer.
Third, a thought for those who believe that the sentences
imposed by federal judges are still wrong in some way-too long,
too short, too heavy on incarceration, too light on rehabilitation
or restorative justice, whatever. The Guidelines still matter. And
given the complete dysfunction of the federal legislative branch,
no serious alteration of the basic structure of those Guidelines is
likely at any time in the foreseeable future. 142 Therefore, the
path to whatever sentencing salvation you seek is through the
United States Sentencing Commission. This is itself a rather
surprising conclusion because, among federal sentencing
cognoscenti, the sotto voce conventional wisdom for some time
past has been that Booker and advisory Guidelines rendered the
Commission a largely irrelevant backwater. As it becomes ever
clearer that the Guidelines continue to drive most federal
sentences and bid fair to do so for years to come, the Commission
has the potential to return to the center of the federal sentencing
debate.
guideline sentencing ranges and providing reasoned justification for any deviation from
the Guidelines despite Booker making the Guidelines advisory).
142. See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 137, at 59 (suggesting Congress is not
likely to make any changes to the Federal Sentencing Laws for political appearance
reasons).
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